Revealed: inside story of US envoy's assassination Exclusive: America 'was warned of embassy attack but did nothing' Kim Sengupta

Revealed: inside story of US envoy's assassination
Exclusive: America 'was warned of embassy attack but did nothing'
Kim Sengupta
Friday 14 September 2012
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/revealed-inside-story-of-us-envoys-assassination-8135797.html

The killings of the US ambassador to Libya and three of his staff were likely to have been the result of a serious and continuing security breach, The Independent can reveal.

American officials believe the attack was planned, but Chris Stevens had been back in the country only a short while and the details of his visit to Benghazi, where he and his staff died, were meant to be confidential.

The US administration is now facing a crisis in Libya. Sensitive documents have gone missing from the consulate in Benghazi and the supposedly secret location of the "safe house" in the city, where the staff had retreated, came under sustained mortar attack. Other such refuges across the country are no longer deemed "safe".

Some of the missing papers from the consulate are said to list names of Libyans who are working with Americans, putting them potentially at risk from extremist groups, while some of the other documents are said to relate to oil contracts.

According to senior diplomatic sources, the US State Department had credible information 48 hours before mobs charged the consulate in Benghazi, and the embassy in Cairo, that American missions may be targeted, but no warnings were given for diplomats to go on high alert and "lockdown", under which movement is severely restricted.

Mr Stevens had been on a visit to Germany, Austria and Sweden and had just returned to Libya when the Benghazi trip took place with the US embassy's security staff deciding that the trip could be undertaken safely.

Eight Americans, some from the military, were wounded in the attack which claimed the lives of Mr Stevens, Sean Smith, an information officer, and two US Marines. All staff from Benghazi have now been moved to the capital, Tripoli, and those whose work is deemed to be non-essential may be flown out of Libya.

In the meantime a Marine Corps FAST Anti-Terrorism Reaction Team has already arrived in the country from a base in Spain and other personnel are believed to be on the way. Additional units have been put on standby to move to other states where their presence may be needed in the outbreak of anti-American fury triggered by publicity about a film which demeaned the Prophet Mohamed.

A mob of several hundred stormed the US embassy in the Yemeni capital Sanaa yesterday. Other missions which have been put on special alert include almost all those in the Middle East, as well as in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Armenia, Burundi and Zambia.

Senior officials are increasingly convinced, however, that the ferocious nature of the Benghazi attack, in which rocket-propelled grenades were used, indicated it was not the result of spontaneous anger due to the video, called Innocence of Muslims. Patrick Kennedy, Under-Secretary at the State Department, said he was convinced the assault was planned due to its extensive nature and the proliferation of weapons.

There is growing belief that the attack was in revenge for the killing in a drone strike in Pakistan of Mohammed Hassan Qaed, an al-Qa'ida operative who was, as his nom-de-guerre Abu Yahya al-Libi suggests, from Libya, and timed for the anniversary of the 11 September attacks.

Senator Bill Nelson, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said: "I am asking my colleagues on the committee to immediately investigate what role al-Qa'ida or its affiliates may have played in the attack and to take appropriate action."

According to security sources the consulate had been given a "health check" in preparation for any violence connected to the 9/11 anniversary. In the event, the perimeter was breached within 15 minutes of an angry crowd starting to attack it at around 10pm on Tuesday night. There was, according to witnesses, little defence put up by the 30 or more local guards meant to protect the staff. Ali Fetori, a 59-year-old accountant who lives near by, said: "The security people just all ran away and the people in charge were the young men with guns and bombs."

Wissam Buhmeid, the commander of the Tripoli government-sanctioned Libya's Shield Brigade, effectively a police force for Benghazi, maintained that it was anger over the Mohamed video which made the guards abandon their post. "There were definitely people from the security forces who let the attack happen because they were themselves offended by the film; they would absolutely put their loyalty to the Prophet over the consulate. The deaths are all nothing compared to insulting the Prophet."

Mr Stevens, it is believed, was left in the building by the rest of the staff after they failed to find him in dense smoke caused by a blaze which had engulfed the building. He was discovered lying unconscious by local people and taken to a hospital, the Benghazi Medical Centre, where, according to a doctor, Ziad Abu Ziad, he died from smoke inhalation.

An eight-strong American rescue team was sent from Tripoli and taken by troops under Captain Fathi al- Obeidi, of the February 17 Brigade, to the secret safe house to extract around 40 US staff. The building then came under fire from heavy weapons. "I don't know how they found the place to carry out the attack. It was planned, the accuracy with which the mortars hit us was too good for any ordinary revolutionaries," said Captain Obeidi. "It began to rain down on us, about six mortars fell directly on the path to the villa."

Libyan reinforcements eventually arrived, and the attack ended. News had arrived of Mr Stevens, and his body was picked up from the hospital and taken back to Tripoli with the other dead and the survivors.

Mr Stevens' mother, Mary Commanday, spoke of her son yesterday. "He did love what he did, and he did a very good job with it. He could have done a lot of other things, but this was his passion. I have a hole in my heart," she said.

[...]

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September 13, 2012
What Was Really Behind the Benghazi Attack?
Posted by Hisham Matar
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2012/09/what-was-really-behind-the-benghazi-attack.html?mbid=social_retweet

Were the attacks on the United States Consulate in Benghazi, which killed the American Ambassador and three other diplomats, motivated by the film that the assailants, and many news networks, claim was their motive? Was it really religious outrage that made a few young men lose their heads and commit murder? Have any of the men who attacked the consulate actually seen the film? I do not know one Libyan who has, despite being in close contact with friends and relatives in Benghazi. And the attack was not preceded by vocal outrage toward the film. Libyan Internet sites and Facebook pages were not suddenly busy with chatter about it.

The film is offensive. It appears that it was made, rather clumsily, with the deliberate intention to offend. And if what happened yesterday was not, as I suspect, motivated by popular outrage, that outrage has now, as it were, caught up with the event. So, some might say, the fact that the attack might have been motivated by different intentions than those stated no longer matters. I don't think so. It is important to see the incident for what it most likely was.

No specific group claimed responsibility for the attack, which was well orchestrated and involved heavy weapons. It is thought to be the work of an extremist faction who, like the Salafis, are willing to use force to exact their will. These groups have perpetrated other similar assaults in Benghazi and elsewhere in Libya. They are utlra-religious, authoritarian groups who justify their actions through selective, corrupt, and ultimately self-serving interpretations of Islam. Under Qaddafi, they kept quiet. In the early days of the revolution some of them claimed that fighting Qaddafi was un-Islamic and conveniently issued a fatwa demanding full obedience to the ruler. This is Libya's extreme right. And, while much is still uncertain, Tuesday's attack appears to have been their attempt to escalate a strategy they have employed ever since the Libyan revolution overthrew Colonel Qaddafi's dictatorship. They see in these days, in which the new Libya and its young institutions are still fragile, an opportunity to grab power. They want to exploit the impatient resentments of young people in particular in order to disrupt progress and the development of democratic institutions.

Even though they appear to be well funded from abroad and capable of ruthless acts of violence against Libyans and foreigners, these groups have so far failed to gain widespread support. In fact, the opposite: their actions have alienated most Libyans.

Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens was a popular figure in Libya, and nowhere more than in Benghazi. Friends and relatives there tell me that the city is mournful. There have been spontaneous demonstrations denouncing the attack. Popular Libyan Web sites are full of condemnations of those who carried out the assault. And there was a general air of despondency in the city Wednesday night. The streets were not as crowded and bustling as usual. There is a deep and palpable sense that Benghazi, the proud birthplace of the revolution, has failed to protect a highly regarded guest. There is outrage that Tripoli is yet to send government officials to Benghazi to condemn the attacks, instigate the necessary investigations and visit the Libyan members of the consulate staff who were wounded in the attack. There is anger, too, toward the government's failure to protect hospitals, courtrooms, and other embassies that have recently suffered similar attacks in Benghazi. The city seems to have been left at the mercy of fanatics. And many fear that it will now become isolated. In fact, several American and European delegates and N.G.O. personnel have cancelled trips they had planned to make to Benghazi.

And these far-right groups that feign religious and moral outrage are being very deliberate in their progress. They have turned a blind eye to what can be argued are conservative Libyans' more traditional concerns. They have said nothing, for example, about the widespread consumption of drugs and alcohol among Libya's youth, about the young men who fill Tripoli's costal cafés late into the night, descending into hopeless states of intoxication before every weekend. This is not an oversight but intentional. Infringing on the freedoms and fun of young people would provoke too much anger and, more crucially, lose the extreme right the support of their main target audience: young men. Like Benito Mussolini's Milan fascio in nineteen-twenties Italy, Libya's far right knows that it cannot rule through violence and fear if it does not have the young and strong on its side.

So instead they have focussed on easy targets: architecture, women, and, now, America, or, more abstractly, the West. They demolished landmarks, claiming them to be unreligious; demanded that women be banned from cafés; and now, because of a film almost no one has seen, they have attacked symbols of the American state. But perhaps this latest assault is their most cunning. Not only because it involved the loss of four innocent lives but also because it is trying cynically to capitalize on legitimate grievances.

It is not unusual to see in city squares or outside shops in Benghazi the American flag along with that of France and Turkey and Qatar, countries that, albeit almost never without ulterior motives, helped Libya's revolution. Yet notwithstanding that sincere gratitude, many Libyans continue to associate America, because of its actions in Iraq and Afghanistan and its defense of Israeli policy, with violent imperial pursuits and double standards.

So far, at least, it appears that the attack on the American consulate has backfired. But that might change. Following a demanding revolution and the exuberances of victory, Libya has entered a phase of fatigue and cynicism. The happiest people seem to be the old and the middle-aged, those whose lives had been most affected by Qaddafi's repression and who are now basking in vindication. The young, however, who form the majority of the population and who are the intended audience for the far right and its violent acts, are impatient, angry, and resentful. Whether secular or religious, they are pissed off. Theirs is an almost existential grievance toward history. If they are not engaged, if their energies and grievances are not attended to, then the road ahead might prove very difficult indeed. And a Libyan version of Milan fascio might yet take hold.

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Libya's Downward Spiral
The country has been going to hell in a handbasket for months now. We just weren't paying attention.
BY CHRISTOPHER S. CHIVVIS | SEPTEMBER 13, 2012
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/13/libyas_dowanward_spiral?page=full

The tragic death this week of four U.S. officials, including the U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens, is a major turning point for Libya's transition to lasting stability.

As details emerge, it appears increasingly probable that al Qaeda-linked groups were behind the violence, likely acting in reprisal for the death of Abu Yaya al-Libi, Al Qaeda's second in command, who was killed by a drone strike in Pakistan earlier this year. Just prior to the Benghazi assault, on the 11th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri released an Internet video in which, according to CNN, he said that al-Libi's "blood is calling, urging and inciting you to fight and kill the crusaders."

Even if the deaths were not linked to al Qaeda or its dangerous North African affiliates, the event is still a major threat to Libya's chances of successful transition to stability, and could be a watershed of the worst kind. The nightmare scenario that Libya could go the way of Iraq in 2004 is still not likely, but no longer seems implausible.

The Libyan government's public statements indicate they fully recognize the gravity of these attacks. The immediate response, if any, must be adroitly measured and await a clear picture of the facts.

In a way, this tragedy is an opportunity for Libya's new government. More than any other event since the fall of Tripoli, the attacks should force the country's leaders to take a much more active approach to ensuring safety and security and pushing ahead with other state-building measures. If these attacks do not galvanize momentum for progress, they could undermine it entirely. Instability in Libya could, in turn, undermine progress elsewhere in a region where transitions are still fragile after the Arab uprisings.

For their part, the United States, its allies, and partners that helped free Libya from Qaddafi's rule have a responsibility to do their utmost -- providing intelligence, technical advice, and, where necessary, military support -- to ensure the situation does not spiral out of control, squandering the investment that was made in toppling Muammar al-Qaddafi last year.

One question many are asking the wake of Tuesday's events: Were the United States and its allies naïve about the dangers in post-intervention Libya? The attacks come on the heels of a gradual deterioration of the country's security in recent months.

Last year's uprising began in Benghazi, Libya's second largest city, where Tuesday's attacks occurred. Qaddafi claimed the revolt was the work of terrorists, long native to Eastern Libya, and warned that if it were not crushed, the country could become the Somalia of the Mediterranean -- a string of radical "Islamic emirates" just across the water from southern Europe.

This was a gross exaggeration -- the vast majority of the revolutionaries had no ties whatsoever to al Qaeda or other terrorist groups, and when Qaddafi moved to raze Benghazi with tanks and aircraft, the Arab League and United Nations condemned him. The United States, its NATO allies, and Gulf partners quickly intervened with massive airpower and a small number of special forces on the ground. The conflict dragged on, but in August, Tripoli fell, and in October, Qaddafi was captured and killed. After four decades of repression under Libya's self-proclaimed "Brother-Leader," Libyans emerged free to build their own future.

But how much building has really been done?

In contrast with nearly all other post-Cold War military interventions, NATO and its partners chose not to deploy post-conflict stabilization forces when the war was over. The security situation seemed calm -- indeed much calmer than many had anticipated it would be. The putative Libyan authorities were adamantly against any such deployment, fearing their already limited legitimacy would be further weakened by the presence of foreign troops on Libyan soil. They needed full credit for their victory, they argued. Few outside powers were interested in putting "boots on the ground" anyway, since most Western leaders had promised that Libya would be very different from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Libya's new leaders were right to be concerned about their legitimacy: They evinced little control over Libya's territory and security, which, for all intents and purposes, was still in the hands of hundreds of armed revolutionary militias that had sprung up across the country during the revolution.

Initial efforts to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate these militias into a centralized Libyan army under the authority of Libya's leadership were quickly abandoned when it appeared that doing so might spark violence and undermine Libya's tenuous stability. Subsequent efforts to do so by international actors met with further resistance and even suspicion from Libyan authorities. Libyan hackles were raised by an initial effort by the British and others trying to help assess Libya's security-sector needs, further slowing reform and disarmament efforts. Meanwhile a hodgepodge of small-scale, apparently grassroots local disarmament initiatives went forward in an uncoordinated fashion.

Luckily, the situation remained relatively calm. Over the course of the next several months, the delicate peace was punctuated by occasional clashes between the militias. Some of the fighting was between pro-regime holdouts and representatives of the new Libya. Other violence, however, was more parochial in nature, with militias battling over turf,in Tripoli and other cities.

Most of this violence, however, did not affect Libya's citizens or significantly hamper progress on other fronts. In July, Libya held successful elections, and moderate secular parties took a plurality of seats in the new Libyan congress. Most outside observers hailed these elections as a major success and evidence that Libya's future was brighter than many had once predicted.

At the same time, however, troubling signs that the security situation was falling apart began to appear. Whereas most of the violence in the first half of the year involved small-scale turf wars between militias and struggles over access to smuggling routes in Libya's distant southern reaches, a new kind of violence had begun to emerge over the summer.

This violence has come in three forms:

First, attacks against Libyan government officials and buildings, both in Benghazi and in Tripoli. Car bombings and small-armed assaults on government buildings indicated a different kind of threat than militia turf wars.

Second, more aggressive actions by radical Islamist militias, who recently destroyed a number of Sufi shrines charging that Sufi practices are un-Islamic. Although it condemned these attacks, the Libyan government put its inability to stop them on full display, weakening its authority.

Third, attacks against diplomats, including an attack against a U.S. diplomatic vehicle in Tripoli and an attack on the British ambassador's car in Benghazi. Until this week, these attacks looked like isolated incidents. Now they appear in a different light.

So who is responsible? While the reaction to the online release of an incendiary film viewed as offensive to the Prophet clearly set the stage for Tuesday's attacks in Libya and Egypt, the attacks in Benghazi, which involved small arms and rocket-propelled grenades, were clearly more than just a mob that got out of control and accidentally burned down the U.S. consulate.

The first impulse of the Libyan government has been to point the finger at holdover Qaddafi-regime sympathizers. That Libya's new government should blame Qaddafi is understandable given how long they suffered under him and the fact that their authority comes from first defying and then ousting him.

But while these claims are plausible, the evidence for them is thin. They seem aimed more at keeping the spirit of the revolution alive in hope of distracting from the slow progress in other areas and the government's own lack of authority.

More likely, groups in eastern Libya that have had ties to al Qaeda are involved. Concerns about groups such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which played an important role in Libya's liberation, are long-standing. Knowledge of such groups initially made several U.S. officials wary of intervention. Even if the LIFG appears now to support the new Libyan state, such concerns have not gone away. The eastern town of Derna is well known as a hotbed of radicalism and source of recruits for the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. This summer, the Libyan authorities, reportedly arrested 20 suspected AQIM members on Libyan soil.

Until now, Libya had enjoyed a relatively calm environment for its transition. To avoid a nightmare scenario, the Libyan government and broader public must use these attacks to galvanize momentum for progress on key fronts -- above all militia disarmament -- building necessary security institutions and establishing a just but effective control of its own territory. Most militias are benign. But as long as they persist, the fractured nature of Libya's security will create opportunities for calamities like this one.

Progress on these fronts, difficult already, will be even harder now because the attacks complicate Libya's relations with the United States and other Western powers. Most U.S. diplomats are being evacuated, and the embassy will likely go on lockdown. The security measures, coupled with the reduction in bandwidth, will seriously hamper the ability of U.S. officials to meet with their Libyan counterparts and access Libyan society at large. Many Western NGOs in Libya are grappling with whether to curtail their efforts, which would further slow progress toward transition.

Meanwhile, the deteriorating security could introduce a new dynamic. The less able the Libyan state is to provide security for Libyan citizens, the more those citizens will turn to other forms of protection -- and the more the legitimacy of the new state and its officials will falter. In these conditions, the appeal of extremist elements could easily grow.

No matter what happens in Libya, history will recall that NATO's intervention saved lives in Benghazi and opened new prospects for Libya's future. But the post-conflict order has been in limbo ever since Qaddafi was killed last October.

Libya is neither Iraq nor Afghanistan, let alone Somalia. It has much going for it that these post-conflict cases did not, including relatively unified citizens, wealth, a neighborhood comparatively conducive to stability, and a clear victory over the former regime.

But Libya's future remains unwritten. NATO's intervention handed the country over to the Libyan people. Now they need to govern it, lest that opportunity slip from their hands.

Christopher S. Chivvis is a senior political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and teaches at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is the author of the forthcoming Toppling Qaddafi, a book on last year's NATO intervention in Libya.

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Divided We Stand: Libya's Enduring Conflicts
Middle East/North Africa Report N°130 14 Sep 2012
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/130-divided-we-stand-libyas-enduring-conflicts.aspx?utm_source=libyareport&utm_medium=1&utm_campaign=mremail

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The 11 September killing of the U.S. ambassador and three of his colleagues is a stark reminder of Libya's security challenges. It also should serve as a wake-up call. There is, of course, more than one way to look at the country today: as one of the more encouraging Arab uprisings, recovering faster than expected; or as a country of regions and localities pulling in different directions, beset by intercommunal strife and where well-armed groups freely roam. Evidence exists for both: successful elections on one hand, violent attacks on the other. In truth, the most and the least promising features of post-Qadhafi Libya stem from a single reality. Because the country lacks a fully functioning state, effective army or police, local actors – notables, civilian and military councils, revolutionary brigades – have stepped in to provide safety, mediate disputes and impose ceasefires. It will not be easy and will have to be done gingerly, but it is past time to reverse the tide, reform army and police and establish structures of a functioning state that can ensure implementation of ceasefire agreements and tackle root causes of conflict.

Colonel Qadhafi's bloody end and the collapse of Libya's police and armed forces left in its wake an armed population with 42 years worth of pent-up grievances. Qadhafi's longstanding divide-and-rule strategy set communities against one other, each vying for a share of resources and the regime's favour. Some towns grew wealthy thanks to connections with the ruling elite; others suffered badly. Meanwhile, the security apparatus at once fomented, manipulated and managed intra-communal conflicts. Once the lid was removed, there was every reason to fear a free-for-all, as the myriad of armed groups that proliferated during the rebellion sought material advantage, political influence or, more simply, revenge. This was all the more so given the security vacuum produced by the regime's precipitous fall.

A measure of chaos ensued, but up to a point only. Communal clashes erupted across the nation both during and after the 2011 conflict. Tensions that had long been left simmering on the back burner came to a boil, aggravated by the diverging positions various communities took vis-à-vis Qadhafi's regime. That most of the fighting ended relatively quickly owes in no small measure to the efforts of local leaders, revolutionary brigades and the variety of civilian and military councils that took it upon themselves to keep the country whole. The ad hoc security patchwork registered significant and even surprising success. But it is no model; even as it manages to contain conflicts, it simultaneously fuels them. Some armed groups cannot resist the temptation to target foes and settle scores; battle for political and economic influence; evade accountability; and entrench geographic and community rivalries.

Until now, central authorities have acted chiefly as bystanders, in effect subcontracting security to largely autonomous armed groups. They had a reason: the army and police were in disarray, suffering from a deficit in personnel and equipment; officers and soldiers had either defected, fled, been killed or jailed. The rebels who rose up against Qadhafi were much better armed and – both suspicious of remnants of the old regime and pleased with their newfound power – unwilling to either surrender their autonomy or come under state control. Yet, it would be wrong to see the parallel military and police forces that emerged as having done so against the central authorities' wishes. Rather, and although they were set up by revolutionary brigades themselves, the Libyan Shield Forces and Supreme Security Committee – the former operating parallel to the army, the latter to the police – were authorised and encouraged to take action by the ruling National Transitional Council, which viewed them as auxiliary forces without which the state simply could not secure the country.

Just as armed groups physically have kept warring parties apart, so have local notables led negotiations designed to achieve longer-lasting ceasefires. Appealing to the higher ideals of Libyan identity and Islam and resorting to social pressure as well as customary law, they have proved remarkably effective mediators.

However, none of this offers a sustainable solution. Truces are fragile, local conflicts frozen rather than durably resolved. In stepping into the breach, local notables and armed groups have done what the government could not. But effective implementation of ceasefire agreements depends in large part on an impartial authority capable of providing services and enforcing decisions. The involvement of revolutionary brigades and local armed groups in efforts to end hostilities blurs the line separating neutral mediation from partisan meddling. In some instances, their attempts to simultaneously play the role of army, police, mediator, judge and jury have helped revive old communal hostilities or competition for control over smuggling routes. The hope is that the central state can set up truly national forces equipped to deal with local disputes, notably a gendarmerie and elite auxiliary corps within the army. Until then, reliance on revolutionary brigades and local armed forces will continue to be an uncertain wager.

Perhaps most serious is the fact that, in the absence of a strong state, agreements mostly have remained dead letters. Disputes are rooted in competing claims over land, property and power that pre-existed Qadhafi and were first exacerbated by his regime's clientelism and patronage networks, next by communities' varying positions during the uprising, and finally by acts of revenge in its aftermath. To resolve them requires clear, written understandings, government follow-up, genuine enforcement and accountability. Too, it necessitates proper policing of borders; fair determination of land ownership where the old regime resorted to confiscation; and some form of transitional justice. All are sorely lacking. Although local notables negotiate agreements, these are seldom unambiguous, committed to paper or coordinated with central authorities. Without an effective government, strong state institutions or police force, follow-through is implausible. The judicial system is overwhelmed and the establishment of a justice and reconciliation process awaits. Hard-earned reconciliation agreements founder.

There is much to celebrate in post-Qadhafi Libya but also reason to worry. The battle between central government and armed groups is not yet won, yet of late the latter have been acting as if they enjoyed the upper hand. If steps are not swiftly taken, reversing this trend is only going to get harder – and what has been a relatively good news story could turn depressingly sour.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To address immediate security needs

To the Government of Libya and the General National Congress (GNC):

1. Set up an interim Crisis Management Unit comprising the prime minister, interior minister, defence minister, and the chief of staff of the armed forces, as well as the heads of the Libyan Shield Forces and Supreme Security Committee or their successors, charged with:

a) coordinating emergency responses to communal conflicts and other armed threats;

b) overseeing governance of areas of the country that are declared "military zones"; and

c) authorising a special inter-ministerial task force answering to the prime minister to implement any decisions related to peace settlements or extraordinary governance issues arising within "military zones".

2. Create a special inter-ministerial task force answering to the prime minister, with representatives from the interior and defence ministries, that would:

a) send representatives from the aforementioned ministries to councils of notables to observe peace negotiations and operate a direct line of communication to relevant ministers and GNC representatives during these;

b) ensure peace agreements are written and specific enough to be implemented; and

c) monitor and oversee implementation of peace settlements through the justice system or relevant ministries and ensure local notables and affected communities are aware of what is being done.

To the Government of Libya and social and tribal leaders (hukama'), notables, prominent personalities and family heads ('a'yan and wujaha') participating in reconciliation councils (lijan al-hukama'):

3. Ensure effective and coordinated monitoring of con­flict zones, reporting back to each other and to the inter-ministerial task force on early warning signs of possible renewed conflict.

4. Consult with all relevant parties as to the feasibility of implementation when considering demands pre­sen­ted to reconciliation councils.

5. Commit peace settlements to writing.

6. Seek the support of international technical experts in conflict resolution, where appropriate.

To the Defence Ministry, including the Chief of Staff of the Libyan Armed Forces:

7. Appoint observers answering directly to the armed forces chief of staff to liaise with the Libyan Shield Forces, border guard units and military councils in conflict zones.

8. Include, for as long as their contracts with the government are active, the Libyan Shield Forces in non-com­bat-related training programs provided by the international community.

To the Libyan Shield Forces, Supreme Security Committee and regional coalitions of revolutionary brigades:

9. Support the work of the Crisis Management Unit and the inter-ministerial task force dedicated to implementing peace settlements in conflict zones.

To the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the European Union:

10. Carry out, with the government's assent and cooperation, an assessment of the army, Libyan Shield Forces and border guard units in military zones, focusing on their performance; status and origins of their weapons stocks; recruitment from, as well as relations with local armed groups and communities; and border management activities.

11. Task observation missions to monitor the progress and implementation of ceasefire agreements in com­munal conflict areas.

To address longer-term institutional security issues

To the Defence Ministry, including the Chief of Staff of the Libyan Armed Forces:

12. Create a new auxiliary corps within the army in charge of future internal deployments to military zones, com­manded by well-vetted, politically unaffiliated military officers and comprising thoroughly-trained fighters from the Libyan Shield Forces and army.

13. Provide incentives for the retirement of existing senior military staff.

To the Interior Ministry:

14. Create a new gendarmerie that will assume responsibility from the army as well as local councils for front line policing duties, including monitoring activities of armed groups, controlling narcotics flows and combating other illicit activities.

15. Form units gradually on a geographically mixed basis and assign such units with a good track record to more challenging conflict areas.

16. Close the Supreme Security Committee, phasing its recruits – subject to the satisfactory completion of training – into the new gendarmerie force.

To the Libyan Shield Forces, Supreme Security Committee and regional coalitions of revolutionary brigades:

17. Cooperate in selecting appropriate officers and fighters for inclusion in a new army corps and gendarmerie, preparing unit commanders for eventual integration.

To the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the European Union:

18. Support the creation of a gendarmerie, replacing the Supreme Security Committee, and of a new auxiliary force within the army, replacing the Libyan Shield Forces.

Tripoli/Brussels, 14 September 2012