Climate Change, Migration And Conflict: Addressing Complex Crisis Scenarios In The 21st Century

The article below can hardly be said to address this issue from a progressive viewpoint, but it addresses the prognosis for climate in the 21st century in a thoughtful, analytical manner, and projects scenarios which I have not read in the MSM.  I trust we can all make the connection for ourselves between climate change and the political and economic systems are responsible for it.

Hajja Romi/Blue

Climate Change, Migration And Conflict: Addressing 
Complex Crisis Scenarios In The 21st Century

By Michael Wertz & Laura Conley 
04 January, 2012
Americanprogress.org
 
The costs and 
consequences of climate change on our world will define the 21st 
century. Even if nations across our planet were to take immediate steps 
to rein in carbon emissions—an unlikely prospect—a warmer climate is 
inevitable. As the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or 
IPCC, noted in 2007, human-created "warming of the climate system is 
unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global 
average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice 
and rising global average sea level."
As these ill effects progress they will have serious implications for U.S. national security interests as well as global 
stability—extending from the sustainability of coastal military 
installations to the stability of nations that lack the resources, good 
governance, and resiliency needed to respond to the many adverse 
consequences of climate change. And as these effects accelerate, the 
stress will impact human migration and conflict around the world.
It is difficult to fully understand the detailed 
causes of migration and economic and political instability, but the 
growing evidence of links between climate change, migration, and 
conflict raise plenty of reasons for concern. This is why it's time to 
start thinking about new and comprehensive answers to multifaceted 
crisis scenarios brought on or worsened by global climate change. As 
Achim Steiner, executive director of the U.N. Environment Program, 
argues, "The question we must continuously ask ourselves in the face of 
scientific complexity and uncertainty, but also growing evidence of 
climate change, is at what point precaution, common sense or prudent 
risk management demands action."
In the coming decades climate change will 
increasingly threaten humanity's shared interests and collective 
security in many parts of the world, disproportionately affecting the 
globe's least developed countries. Climate change will pose challenging 
social, political, and strategic questions for the many different 
multinational, regional, national, and nonprofit organizations dedicated to improving the human condition worldwide. Organizations as different 
as Amnesty International, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the World Bank, the International Rescue Committee, and the World 
Health Organization will all have to tackle directly the myriad effects 
of climate change.
Climate change also poses distinct challenges to 
U.S. national security. Recent intelligence reports and war games, 
including some conducted by the U.S. Department of Defense, conclude 
that over the next two or three decades, vulnerable regions 
(particularly sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast 
Asia) will face the prospect of food shortages, water crises, and 
catastrophic flooding driven by climate change. These developments could demand U.S., European, and international humanitarian relief or 
military responses, often the delivery vehicle for aid in crisis 
situations.
This report provides the foundation and overview for a series of papers focusing on the particular challenges posed by the 
cumulative effects of climate change, migration, and conflict in some of our world's most complex environments. In the papers following this 
report, we plan to outline the effects of this nexus in northwest 
Africa, in India and Bangladesh, in the Andean region of South America, 
and in China. In this paper we detail that nexus across our planet and 
offer wide ranging recommendations about how the United States, its 
allies in the global community, and the community at large can deal with the coming climate-driven crises with comprehensive sustainable 
security solutions encompassing national security, diplomacy, and 
economic, social, and environmental development.
Here, we briefly summarize our arguments and our conclusions.
The nexus
The Arab Spring can be at least partly credited to 
climate change. Rising food prices and efforts by authoritarian regimes 
to crush political protests were linked first to food and then to 
political repression—two important motivators in the Arab makeover this 
past year.
[JR: See The Economist: "The high cost of food is one reason that protesters took to the streets in Tunisia and Egypt." and Reports: Egyptian and Tunisian riots were driven in part by the spike in global food prices.]
To be sure, longstanding economic and social 
distress and lack of opportunity for so many Arab youth in the Middle 
East and across North Africa only needed a spark to ignite revolutions 
across the region. But environmental degradation and the movement of 
people from rural areas to already overcrowded cities alongside rising 
food prices enabled the cumulative effects of long-term economic and 
political failures to sweep across borders with remarkable agility.
It does not require much foresight to acknowledge 
that other effects of climate change will add to the pressure in the 
decades to come. In particular the cumulative overlays of climate change with human migration driven by environmental crises, political conflict caused by this migration, and competition for more scarce resources 
will add new dimensions of complexity to existing and future crisis 
scenarios. It is thus critical to understand how governments plan to 
answer and prioritize these new threats from climate change, migration, 
and conflict.
[JR: For background analysis see "Climate Story of the Year: Warming-Driven Drought and Extreme Weather Emerge as Key Threat to Global Food Security" and links therein.]
Climate change
Climate change alone poses a daunting challenge. No 
matter what steps the global community takes to mitigate carbon 
emissions, a warmer climate is inevitable. The effects are already being felt today and will intensify as climate change worsens. All of the 
world's regions and nations will experience some of the effects of this 
transformational challenge.
Here's just one case in point: African states are 
likely to be the most vulnerable to multiple stresses, with up to 250 
million people projected to suffer from water and food insecurity and, 
in low-lying areas, a rising sea level. As little as 1 percent of 
Africa's land is located in low-lying coastal zones but this land 
supports 12 percent of its urban population.
Furthermore, a majority of people in Africa live in 
lower altitudes—including the Sahel, the area just south of the 
Sahara—where the worst effects of water scarcity, hotter temperatures, 
and longer dry seasons are expected to occur. These developments may 
well be exacerbated by the lack of state and regional capacity to manage the effects of climate change. These same dynamics haunt many nations 
in Asia and the Americas, too, and the implications for developed 
countries such as the United States and much of Europe will be profound.
Migration
Migration adds another layer of complexity to the 
scenario. In the 21st century the world could see substantial numbers of climate migrants—people displaced by either the slow or sudden onset of the effects of climate change. The United Nations' recent Human 
Development Report stated that, worldwide, there are already an 
estimated 700 million internal migrants—those leaving their homes within their own countries—a number that includes people whose migration is 
related to climate change and environmental factors. Overall migration 
across national borders is already at approximately 214 million people 
worldwide, with estimates of up to 20 million displaced in 2008 alone 
because of a rising sea level, desertification, and flooding.
One expert, Oli Brown of the International Institute for Sustainable Development, predicts a tenfold increase in the current number of internally displaced persons and international refugees by 
2050. It is important to acknowledge that there is no consensus on this 
estimate. In fact there is major disagreement among experts about how to identify climate as a causal factor in internal and international 
migration.
But even though the root causes of human mobility 
are not always easy to decipher, the policy challenges posed by that 
movement are real. A 2009 report by the International Organization for 
Migration produced in cooperation with the United Nations University and the Climate Change, Environment and Migration Alliance cites numbers 
that range from "200 million to 1 billion migrants from climate change 
alone, by 2050," arguing that "environmental drivers of migration are 
often coupled with economic, social and developmental factors that can 
accelerate and to a certain extent mask the impact of climate change."
The report also notes that "migration can result 
from different environmental factors, among them gradual environmental 
degradation (including desertification, soil and coastal erosion) and 
natural disasters (such as earthquakes, floods or tropical storms)." 
(See box on page 15 of the report for a more detailed definition of 
climate migrants.) Clearly, then, climate change is expected to 
aggravate many existing migratory pressures around the world. Indeed 
associated extreme weather events resulting in drought, floods, and 
disease are projected to increase the number of sudden humanitarian 
crises and disasters in areas least able to cope, such as those already 
mired in poverty or prone to conflict.
Conflict
This final layer is the most unpredictable, both 
within nations and transnationally, and will force the United States and the international community to confront climate and migration 
challenges within an increasingly unstructured local or regional 
security environment. In contrast to the great power conflicts and the 
associated proxy wars that marked most of the 20th century, the 
immediate post-Cold War decades witnessed a diffusion of national 
security interests and threats. U.S. national security policy is 
increasingly integrating thinking about nonstate actors and 
nontraditional sources of conflict and instability, for example in the 
fight against Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups.
Climate change is among these newly visible issues 
sparking conflict. But because the direct link between conflict and 
climate change is unclear, awareness of the indirect links has yet to 
lead to substantial and sustained action to address its security 
implications. Still the potential for the changing climate to induce 
conflict or exacerbate existing instability in some of the world's most 
vulnerable regions is now recognized in national security circles in the United States, although research gaps still exists in many places.
The climate-conflict nexus was highlighted with 
particular effect by the current U.S. administration's security-planning reviews over the past two years, as well as the Center for Naval 
Analysis, which termed climate change a "threat multiplier," indicating 
that it can exacerbate existing stresses and insecurity. The Pentagon's 
latest Quadrennial Defense Review also recognized climate change as an 
"accelerant of instability or conflict," highlighting the operational 
challenges that will confront U.S. and partner militaries amid a rising 
sea level, growing extreme weather events, and other anticipated effects of climate change. The U.S. Department of Defense has even voiced 
concern for American military installations that may be threatened by a 
rising sea level.
There is also well-developed international analysis 
on these points. The United Kingdom's 2010 Defense Review, for example, 
referenced the security aspects of climate change as an evolving 
challenge for militaries and policymakers. Additionally, in 2010, the 
Nigerian government referred to climate change as the "greatest 
environmental and humanitarian challenge facing the country this 
century," demonstrating that climate change is no longer seen as solely 
scientific or environmental, but increasingly as a social and political 
issue cutting across all aspects of human development.
As these three threads—climate change, migration, 
and conflict—interact more intensely, the consequences will be 
far-reaching and occasionally counterintuitive. It is impossible to 
predict the outcome of the Arab Spring movement, for example, but the 
blossoming of democracy in some countries and the demand for it in 
others is partly an unexpected result of the consequences of climate 
change on global food prices. On the other hand, the interplay of these 
factors will drive complex crisis situations in which domestic policy, 
international policy, humanitarian assistance, and security converge in 
new ways.
Areas of concern
Several regional hotspots frequently come up in the 
international debate on climate change, migration, and conflict. Climate migrants in northwest Africa, for example, are causing communities 
across the region to respond in different ways, often to the detriment 
of regional and international security concerns. Political and social 
instability in the region plays into the hands of organizations such as 
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. And recent developments in Libya, 
especially the large number of weapons looted from depots after 
strongman Moammar Qaddafi's regime fell— which still remain unaccounted 
for—are a threat to stability across North Africa.
Effective solutions need not address all of these 
issues simultaneously but must recognize the layers of relationships 
among them. And these solutions must also recognize that these variables will not always intersect in predictable ways. While some migrants may 
flee floodplains, for example, others may migrate to them in search of 
greater opportunities in coastal urban areas.
Bangladesh, already well known for its disastrous 
floods, faces rising waters in the future due to climate-driven glacial 
meltdowns in neighboring India. The effects can hardly be over. In 
December 2008 the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., ran 
an exercise that explored the impact of a flood that sent hundreds of 
thousands of refugees into neighboring India. The result: the exercise 
predicted a new wave of migration would touch off religious conflicts, 
encourage the spread of contagious diseases, and cause vast damage to 
infrastructure.
India itself is not in a position to absorb 
climate-induced pressures—never mind foreign climate migrants. The 
country will contribute 22 percent of global population growth and have 
close to 1.6 billion inhabitants by 2050, causing demographic 
developments that are sure to spark waves of internal migration across 
the country.
Then there's the Andean region of South America, 
where melting glaciers and snowcaps will drive climate, migration, and 
security concerns. The average rate of glacial melting has doubled over 
the past few years, according to the World Glacier Monitoring Service. 
Besides Peru, which faces the gravest consequences in Latin America, a 
number of other Andean countries will be massively affected, including 
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia. This development will put water 
security, agricultural production, and power generation at risk—all 
factors that could prompt people to leave their homes and migrate. The 
IPCC report argues that the region is especially vulnerable because of 
its fragile ecosystem.
Finally, China is now in its fourth decade of 
ever-growing internal migration, some of it driven in recent years by 
environmental change. Today, across its vast territory, China continues 
to experience the full spectrum of climate change-related consequences 
that have the potential to continue to encourage such migration. The 
Center for a New American Security recently found that the consequences 
of climate change and continued internal migration in China include 
"water stress; increased droughts, flooding, or other severe events; 
increased coastal erosion and saltwater inundation; glacial melt in the 
Himalayas that could affect hundreds of millions; and shifting 
agricultural zones"—all of which will affect food supplies.
These four regions of the world—northwest Africa, 
India and Bangladesh, the Andean region, and China—will require global, 
regional, and local policies to deal with the consequences of climate 
change, migration, and conflict. Alas, such policies that might be 
effective in these complex crisis environments cannot be designed within the existing global institutional framework. There are many reasons for this.
In the United States, as in many other developed 
nations, the defense, diplomacy, and economic and social development 
silos are not adept at analyzing the input of a broad range of policy 
fields in combination with direct dialogue with the people of the 
affected regions. From Europe's perspective, the fragmented nature of 
the continent's reaction to rising climate migrants from Africa stands 
out. From the perspective of regional powers such as India, China, 
Brazil, and South Africa, there are yet again different sets of policy 
priorities that block action. And from the perspective of multilateral 
organizations, there is another set of policy disconnects.
Yet action is critical. Environmentally induced 
migration, resource conflicts, and unstable states will not only have an impact upon the nations where they occur, but also on the United States and the broader international community.
Moving forward
The interplay of migration, climate change, and 
conflict is complex and will be with us for the long term. Nevertheless, the uncertainty surrounding the exact causality should not be a reason 
for ignoring this key nexus. And while the causal relationship may not 
always be clear, the lines of inquiry moving forward are becoming 
apparent. To understand this nexus, we will need to ask, for example, 
what role mediating factors such as economic opportunity, levels of 
development, health indicators, and legal status will play in the 
relationship between climate change and migration. It will be equally 
critical to determine whether there is a threshold at which the effects 
of climate change could be significant enough to cause migration 
directly, or at what level of climate change it will become the most 
important of several migration "push" factors.
Additionally, we should ask whether climate change 
will alter the composition of migrant communities. Migrants, after all, 
are not necessarily the most desperate or destitute of their countrymen 
and women. Migrations, particularly across international borders, often 
require means. Could a significant increase in extreme weather events or long-term shifts in climate norms alter this dynamic, and what would be the implications of that shift?
Some instances of the complete climate, migration, 
and conflict nexus exist to guide the examination of these questions. 
Consider, for example, the Second Tuareg Rebellion in Mali in 1990. 
British economist Nicholas Stern argues that drought in Mali in the 
decades preceding the conflict contributed to local and international 
migration. Those who later tried to return found a "lack of social 
support networks for returning migrants, continuing drought, and 
competition for resources between nomadic and settled people," all of 
which were among the factors that sparked the rebellion.
Jeffrey Mazo at the International Institute of 
Strategic Studies adds that the forced migration ultimately pushed some 
young men into Algeria and Libya, "where many were radicalized"—a 
dangerous development in an already unstable region. In past months 
refugees from Qaddafi's former regime in Libya have been taking refuge 
with the Tuareg along the borders of Libya, Algeria, and Mali.
Imagine similar migration-fueled conflicts in India 
and Bangladesh, the Andean region, and in China. We can't know how they 
might develop but we do know the three ingredients—climate change, 
migration, and conflict. From the perspective of a forward-looking 
policymaker, situations like this suggest that the uncertainty that 
still surrounds the climate, migration, and conflict nexus requires 
greater attention when it comes to security solutions, not less.
In this paper and the reports to follow, we will 
discuss regional case studies in which the cumulative effects of climate change, migration, and conflict interact within a broad framework of 
political, economic, and environmental security challenges. Our 
objective is to develop a robust contemporary notion of sustainable 
security that effectively integrates defense, diplomacy, and development into a comprehensive policy designed to deal with today's global 
threats while preventing future threats from occurring.
We delve into these recommendations in detail at the end of this paper but in this section we briefly explain how we believe the international community, the United States, its allies, and key 
regional players can together create a sustainable security situation to deal with climate change, migration, and conflict. Specifically they 
must:
>> Conduct federal government institutional 
reform in the United States that addresses the development-security 
relationship and that prioritizes planning for long-term humanitarian 
consequences of climate change and migration as a core national security issue
>> Develop strategies to strengthen intergovernmental cooperation on transboundary risks in different regions of the world
>>> Increase funding for the Global Climate Change Initiative
>>> Ensure better information flows and more effective disaster response for early-warning systems
>>> Support the best science to expand our 
understanding of specific circumstances such as desertification, 
rainfall variability, disaster occurrence, and coastal erosion, and 
their relation to human migration and conflict
>>> Identify regions most vulnerable to 
climate-induced migration, both forced and voluntary, in order to target aid, information, and contingency-planning capabilities
>>> View migration as a proactive adaptation 
strategy for local populations under pressure due to increased 
environmental change
A truly sustainable approach to security, then, 
requires us not only to look at the traditional security threats posed 
by the interaction between states, but also to understand that the 
security of the United States is advanced by promoting the individual 
well-being of people across the developing world, and by embracing 
collective responses to shared threats posed by climate change. We turn 
first to understanding the dynamics of those threats.
Michael Werz is a Senior Fellow at the American Progress, where his work as member of the National Security Team focuses on the nexus of climate change, migration, and security and emerging democracies.Laura Conley is a graduate student in international relations at the University of 
Chicago. Previously, she was a Research Associate for National Security 
and International Policy at the Center for American Progress.
This piece was originally posted at the Center for American Progress website.

http://www.countercurrents.org/conley040112.htm